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ABSTRACT

William Langer is firmly established as a legend in
North Dakota history.

The legend began during his

controversial terms as attorney general (1916-1920) and
governor (1932-1934 and 1936-1938).

A maverick in the

United States Senate after his election to the upper
chamber in 1940, admirers saw him as a civil libertarian
and a defender of the "common man."

The loyalty and

devotion of his constituents increased over the years
because of his willingness to do favors for them and
because of his considerable campaign skills.

However, a

study of his papers, the Congressional Record, and
newspaper and magazine articles reveals that Langer
introduced few bills that were enacted into law.

In

addition, he was not taken seriously by his fellow Senators
and often devoted his time in Congress to the obstruction
of Senate business.
The first chapter outlines Langer's career before he
entered the Senate in 1941, paying particular attention to
the development of his political ideas and strategies.

The

second chapter is an assessment of Langer's peculiar habits

vi

in the Senate, as well as a summation of the the views of
his colleagues and of the national media towards the North
Dakotan.
Chapter three questions the notion that Langer was a
humanitarian liberal by concluding that his advocacy of
liberal causes was severely limited by his inability to
translate his ideas into law.

Few of Langer's proposals

were taken seriously; his civil rights proposals in particular were usually intended to obstruct Senate business by
·fostering heated debate.
Chapter four examines Langer's opposition to the
Internal Security Act of 1950 and concludes that, although
Langer argued against the Act on civil libertarian grounds,
his opposition was actually based on the limits the Act
placed on immigration by Germans.
Chapter five details Langer's response to the McCarthy
era and concludes that, although he never hesitated to
employ anti-communist rhetoric, Langer can be properly
placed in neither the McCarthyite nor the anti-McCarthyite
camp.
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Introduction

The William Langer legend is still very much alive in
North Dakota.

North Dakotans born long after his death in

1959 can recite stories told by their parents or
grandparents about "Wild Bill."
Most stories about Langer center around a favor that he
did for a North Dakotan and most hint that he was probably
corrupt.

One person might tell of the time Governor Langer

had state employees paint a relative's house; another of how
Senator Langer got him out of the Army during World War II;
yet another of how constituents continued to threaten
uncooperative public officials with their intention to write
Langer for help five years after his death.
Although Langer had already secured a prominent
position in North Dakota history and folklore by 1940, his
legend continued to grow while he was in the Senate.
Elected with less than forty percent of the vote in 1940, in
1958 he carried every county in the state without having
received the endorsement of any party.
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Langer's legendary status presents problems for the
historian.

Langer sought to build his legend while he was

alive by exaggerating his early accomplishments.

Con-

sequently, many facts about his early life have become
clouded in myth.

In addition, the hundreds of boxes of his.

correspondence in the Elwyn B. Robinson Department of
Special Collections in the Chester Fritz Library at the
University of North Dakota present Langer as he wanted to be
seen by his constituents.

Taken alone, his papers serve

only to add to the Langer legend.
The legend begins to crumble, however, when one
searches for Langer's tangible achievements.
reached the Senate, there were very few.

Once he

A study of the

Congressional Record reveals a Langer who was not taken
seriously by his colleagues and who, with little or no
reason, often brought the machinery of the Senate to a
grinding halt.
Inspired by the discovery of Langer's celebrated
filibuster of the Internal Security Act of 1950, I decided
to study Langer's response to the McCarthy era.

That study

proceeded for a some time under a few false premises.
First, I assumed that Langer was under the same Cold War
electoral pressures as other senators.

Given his loyal

personal following, however, Langer was virtually immune to
charges based upon ideology.

Second, I assumed that his

statements were a true reflection of his political
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philosophy.

As often as not, however, his pronouncements

were every bit as complex and contradictory as were his
motives.

Third, I assumed that Langer was taken seriously

by his colleagues and by the media.
however, he was not.

For the most part,

Langer once gleefully agreed to the

charge that he was little more than a "messenger boy" for
the people of North Dakota.

A study of his career in the

Senate makes it clear that this claim was more than a
campaign ploy.

If one must assess Langer's accomplishments

in Washington, they would probably amount to little more
than the favors he did for individual constituents.

Langer

spent more time talking on the Senate floor than did most of
his colleagues, but he accomplished little or nothing by
doing so.
Yet, Langer loyalists in North Dakota and around the
nation continued to hail him as a champion of the common
person, and the voters of North Dakota, as well as his
colleagues in the Senate, grew to admire him more and more
as time passed.

I
Langer's Background in North Dakota Politics

William Langer entered upon the North Dakota political
scene soon after he graduated with degrees in liberal arts
and law from Columbia University in 1910.

Langer was

determined to make his classmates back east "sit up and take
notice" of what he would accomplish in North Dakota.

His

classmates did not doubt his ability to do so; their
prophecy was that Langer would become a United States
Senator and be the third politician in American history to
be "at the same time fearless and truthful."

The other two

with such qualities had been Abraham Lincoln and Theodore
Roosevelt.

1

After Langer had secured a position with the law firm
of H. R. Bitzing in Mandan in 1910, Bitzing, who was Morton
county states attorney, appointed him assistant states
attorney.

Langer soon made his mark.

In one of his first

actions as states attorney, he requested that thousands of
acres of railroad land be put on the tax roles.

The

railroads challenged the action, but Langer both won in the
district court and the state supreme court.

4

The case sent a
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signal to other counties along the Northern Pacific Railroad
line.

Soon thousands of additional acres of railroad land

were taxed as well and Langer gained a reputation for
fighting the "interests."
In 1914, at the age of twenty-eight, Langer ran for
states attorney of Morton County and won handily.

As states

attorney, he concentrated on enforcing prohibition, promoting badly needed property tax reform, and enforcing compulsory school attendance laws.
uproar.

His methods often caused an

Soon after he took office, he arrested over 150

citizens of Mandan and charged them with liquor violations.
He also promised to arrest the parents of children who were
not attending school.

Even those who Langer's actions

affected came to admire his determination and courage.
As .states attorney, Langer built support for a bid to
become North Dakota's attorney general in 1916.

After

receiving the support of temperance organizations, the
education establishment, and the progressive wing of the
Republican party, Langer successfully sought the endorsement
of the Nonpartisan League.

Thus was born an association

with an organization that he would eventually turn into a
personal machine.

Langer won the election of 1916 and moved

across the river from Mandan to the state capital in
Bismarck.
As attorney general, Langer continued to focus on
morality issues.

In his effort to clean up the liquor

establishments and "bawdy houses" in the city of Minot, he
arrested several prominent citizens and shut down the phone
exchange at gunpoint.

The phone company charged that Langer

had illegally seized their property, and Langer was in turn
arrested by local authorities.

The arrest may have been

intended to protect Langer from the angry citizens of Minot;
the phone company later dropp~d charges once Langer had
safely returned to Bismarck.
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Langer won a second term in 1918 but soon angered
leaders of the Nonpartisan League by defending one of its
opponents, Minnie Nielson.

Nielson, whom a League candidate

had defeated in the primary election for the office of state
superintendent of public instruction, staged a campaign in
the general election and won.

Nielson's victory angered the

League leadership, and Langer was requested to declare her
legally unqualified for office.

He refused.

Langer further antagonized the League l~adership when
he investigated a League-run bank in Fargo and found that it
had loaned money equivalent to several times its capital.
Because it was League enterprises that had borrowed the
money, and because the bank allowed those enterprises to use
post-dated checks collected from farmers in the form of dues
as collateral, Langer feared that the farmers could suffer
in the end and, consequently, closed the bank.
By 1919 Langer believed that the Nonpartisan League had
drifted from its original purpose and had become corrupt.
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He accused outsiders and radicals of using the League to
fleece North Dakota farmers.

Among these radicals,

according to Langer, were members of the Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW). As attorney general he hired private
detectives from Kansas City to infiltrate the labor
federation, but was disappointed when their efforts turned
up no evidence of radicalism or conspiracy in the IWW.
Although Langer continued to support the League's
original program, he decided in the fall of 1919 to run for
governor against the NPL.

During the subsequent 1920

campaign, many believed that Langer supported the
publication of The Red Flame, a scurrilous magazine
dedicated to associating the Nonpartisan League with
Bolshevism, free love, and godlessness.

Langer gave

speeches as far away as Kansas, warning farmers of the
dangers of the League.

In a marriage of convenience Langer

accepted the nomination of the infant Independent Voters
Association (IVA) but lost in the primary election to the
incumbent League candidate Lynn Frazier.
During the years from 1920 to 1928, Langer limited his
political activity to working for the election of other
candidates.

In 1920, as he had in 1916, Langer served as

state chairman for the committee that supported California
Senator Hiram Johnson for the presidency.

In 1924 he

actively supported Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin for the
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presidency, and in 1928 he backed Democrat Al Smith of New
York.
During these years, Langer repudiated the IVA and
returned to the Nonpartisan League.

It was a far different

League from the one Langer had abandoned; the radical
element, including A. C. Townley, was long gone.

The League

organization had deteriorated to little more than a shell.
After the NFL met with disaster in the 1928 elections, its
leadership was reshuffled and Langer took over most of the
control.
Langer reorganized the local League groups and made the
primary qualification for local party positions loyalty to
himself rather than loyalty to the League.

3

In 1930, he

sought to revive the Leader, the defunct League organ, but
lack of funds forced Langer to put his plans on hold.
The Depression increased the prospects for what was now
William Langer's Nonpartisan League.

Both the League and

the Republican party nominated Langer for the governorship
in 1932, and with his victory, Langer became the only
Republican governor elected in the nation that year.

The

positions he took during the campaign were vague, but he did
come out in favor of reductions in state expenses and in
real estate taxes.

After his inauguration Langer shocked

many supporters by advocating a 2 percent sales tax.

The

NFL-dominated legislature acceded to his wishes, but the tax
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was inunediately referred to the voters of North Dakota and
soundly defeated.
Langer's first tenure as governor was filled with
controversy.

North Dakota's economy was in a crisis

unequalled in the state's history.

In 1932, in an attempt

to help suffering farmers, Langer declared a five-year
moratorium on farm foreclosures.

He called out the National

Guard on several occasions to enforce the moratorium, which
many contemporary observers believed conflicted with federal
law.
Also in 1932, Langer declared an embargo of North
Dakota wheat in an attempt to raise the price of grain.

The

price did go up, but because the federal government made a
large purchase of wheat at the same time, it is not clear
that Langer's embargo deserves the credit for the increase.
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The courts later declared the embargo unconstitutional.
Langer came under fire for his administration of the
relief funds the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
(FERA) program provided North Dakotans.

Relief request

forms required that applicants declare who they supported
for the office of governor in the last election and required
the signature of the local NPL precinct committeeman.

Harry

Hopkins, the head FERA administrator in Washington, received
numerous reports that Langer was playing politics with the
agency's relief money.

5
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Langer's continued efforts to revive the Leader brought
him further trouble.

After his attempts to raise money in

1930 fell flat, Langer hit upon a scheme to assess all state
employees 5 percent of their annual salaries to fund the
paper.

The plan came unglued when some Langer supporters

violated a federal law by soliciting contributions from
federal employees working in North Dakota.
A federal trial followed in 1934, and the court found
Langer guilty.

Due to the obvious lack of impartiality on

-the part of presiding judge Andrew Miller, who had held a
grudge against Langer dating back to Langer's days as
assistant states attorney, the governor stood a good chance
of overturning the verdict upon appeal.

Meanwhile, however,

the Supreme Court ruled that Langer by virtue of the guilty
verdict was no longer governor.

Lieutenant Governor Ole

Olson officially became the chief executive.
Because Langer was ineligible to run for governor in
1934, his wife Lydia ran instead.

She made a respectable

showing in the general election, but lost to Democrat Thomas
Moody.

To dispose of Moody, Langer investigated his

background and found that he was not legally eligible to
hold the office of governor in North Dakota.

After the

Supreme Court ousted Moody, Lieutenant Governor Walter
Welford became North Dakota's fourth governor in seven
months in February of 1935.
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The courts granted Langer a second trial, but it was no
less controversial than the first.

Langer later admitted

that he had paid money to the son of the judge, although
Langer claimed that he owed the man the money, and critics
charged that Langer cronies worked to influence two men on
the jury who later caused a hung jury by refusing to vote to
uphold Langer's conviction.

A third trial found Langer not

guilty of perjuring himself in the first trial, and a fourth
trial on the original charges ended in a decision of "not
guilty."

Langer had avoided jail, but his support within

the NPL and across the state had withered.
After mending fences within the NPL, Langer won the
League endorsement for the governorship at the 1936
convention but lost in the primary to Walter Welford.
Undaunted, he ran as in independent in the general election
and won with 36 percent of the vote.
Langer's second term as governor was only slightly less
turbulent than his first.

He immediately caused an uproar

by firing several members of the faculty and administration
at the agriculture college in Fargo.

Many charged that

Langer was merely attempting to assert control over the
considerable funds spent by the college.

As a direct result

of the firings, the college lost its accreditation and was
censured by the American Association of University
Professors.
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Langer continued to draw accusations of corruption.

He

sold what was generally regarded to be worthless stock to an
attorney for the Northern Pacific Railroad for $25,000 and
soon used his pos.i tion on the Tax Commission to lower the
railroad's tax bill.

He helped a bond firm make a

commission of nearly a quarter of a million dollars in
dealings with the Bank of North Dakota and then sold land to
a partner in the firm for a sum that Langer later admitted
to Congress was more than twice its market value.
Langer's preoccupation with the Leader continued.
Instead of soliciting "donations" from the salaries of state
employees, Langer financed the paper by filling it with
large advertisements for the state mill and elevator.

It

did not matter that there was no need for the elevator to
advertise to the farmers from whom it purchased wheat.

6

Langer sought a United States Senate seat in 1938 but
met head on with the incumbent Gerald Nye who was at the
peak of his popularity due to his investigations into the
dealings of munitions makers during World War I.

Langer

helped Nye by ignoring national issues and concentrating
instead upon publicizing his own record as governor.

After

losing the primary to Nye, Langer again ran as an independent in the general election and was soundly defeated.
To prevent Langer from doing in 1940 what he had done
in the previous two elections, his enemies in the
legislature passed a law which prohibited candidates from
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running in general elections if they had been defeated for
the same office in the primary.

Their strategy backfired in

1940 when Langer scored an upset victory in the Republican
senatorial primary against Lynn Frazier.

Langer's opponents

believed that Frazier could win as an independent in the
general election, but the legislature's recent actions
legally barred him from running.

Instead, William Lemke

made the 1940 Senate race another three-way affair by
abandoning his race for a seat in the House of Representatives and running for the Senate as an independent.
Langer won the election with only 38 percent of the
vote, but soon faced charges of fraud.

A group of North

Dakotans would attempt to deny Langer a seat in the Senate
due to his "moral turpitude," but William Langer had finally
achieved his long-sought-after status as a United States
Senator.
The patterns established during Langer's career before
1940 were to continue to be evident during his time in the
Senate.
Early in Langer's career, he saw his primary base of
political support to be the German population of North
Dakota.

In his first political contest for the post of

state's attorney for Morton County, each ethnic group
supported its own candidate.
the Germans.

Langer was the candidate of

In those days many of the German citizens

spoke little or no English and Langer was the only candidate
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who spoke German.

In the predominantly German rural areas

of the county, Langer received nearly every vote. 7
From that first campaign onwards, Langer did not
hesitate to address crowds in both German and English.

The

German population continued to vote heavily for him, and he
subsequently considered German North Dakotans his own
special constituency.
When Langer ran for attorney general, he made direct
appeals to the German population.

In a press release during

that campaign, Langer claimed that" . . . Germans all over
the state of North Dakota are insisting that a German who
has made a wonderful and extraordinary record as States
Attorney of Morton County, be their representative on the
state republican ticket, and that William Langer be the
candidate representing Germans. 118

During the same campaign,

Langer's literature emphasized that "He comes from a well
known German family and is a native of North Dakota. 119
Langer began his political career as a Progressive; his
role models were Theodore Roosevelt and Robert LaFollette.
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He retained his progressive tendencies throughout his
career, becoming something of a relic of the era during his
later years in the Senate.

His progressive background is

crucial in explaining Langer's reaction to the politics of
the Cold War.
During his early career, Langer was often a moralistic
progressive before he was a practitioner of ethnic politics.
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As states attorney, Langer offended many Germans with his
stringent enforcement of compulsory school attendance
laws. 11

Langer's rigid enforcement of prohibition had also

offended many Germans, and he sought to keep them in his
camp by appealing to their higher ideals.

According to his

campaign literature, Langer would "not attempt to get the
votes of Germans by promising [them] free and open saloons
sometime in the dim future.

1112

With the outbreak of World War I, however, prohibition
faded into the background as German-Americans became more
worried about attacks on their loyalty and patriotism than
they were concerned about their right to drink beer.

Langer

wasted no time coming to the defense of individual Germans
who came under fire, as well as to the defense of GermanAmericans as a group.

World War I was one of many times

when Langer worked to strengthen his political base by
rallying to the defense of German-Americans.

Although

Langer's German support was to decline in importance as he
developed a constituency of personal followers which
transcended ethnic lines, his support of the interests of
Germans was to become a central feature of his career in the
United States Senate.
Langer was always an avid writer of letters.

From the

earliest years of his political career, he kept a carbon
copy of almost every letter he mailed, whether it was
personal or political.

He rarely let even the most critical
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or trivial of letters go unanswered, including the many
which arrived from outside the state of North Dakota.

He

gave equal credence to every letter no matter how humble in
appearance or origin.

His attention to correspondence

became one of Langer's most potent political weapons in the
Senate.
The emphasis Langer placed upon correspondence was
merely a part of Langer's gift at the game of "personal
politics."

In a state with few people, a politician could

build a following based not on ideology or party but on
personal contact.

According to one of his classmates at

Columbia University, Langer had a "talent for friendship. 1113
His extraordinary memory for names and faces as well as his
magnetism, his impressive physical appearance, and his
irresistable friendliness enabled him to make an impression
upon everyone he met.

His enormous energy for campaigning

sometimes took him to the steps of a farmer's house at three
o'clock in the morning on his way to a political speech the
next day.
When he campaigned for the governorship in 1932, Langer
promised members of his audiences that if they ever had
problems, they could just come down to his office and let
him know.

After he entered the statehouse, the waiting room

outside his office was often full of farmers in difficulty
due to the Depression.

Langer kept his promise and spent

long hours meeting with each of the aggrieved parties.
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Langer had great sympathy for individual complaints and
grievances, and he recognized that there was no better way
to win a person's vote for many elections to come, no matter
what his party allegiance, than by doing the person a favor.
He reveled in situations where he was able to grant a person
a favor.

Even if a law ·were obviously flawed, Langer

preferred to grant hundreds of individual exemptions and
exceptions rather than to change the law.
After he declared a moratorium on farm foreclosures
during the Depression, it became apparent that the declaration at times hurt innocent people and at other times
helped the hated "interests."

Rather than repair or replace

the original declaration, Langer considered each case
individually.

According to historian Glenn H. Smith, Langer

usually "served as the judge and jury and issued instructions based solely upon a note or letter from a mortagagee
or lawyer which outlined the facts as he saw them. 1114

The

exemptions, exceptions, and even contradictory new
proclamations were hopelessly inconsistent and led to
confusion.

What mattered to Langer was that in each case

the grievance was addressed, not through legislative
maneuvering or bureaucratic procedure, but through the
personal intervention of Bill Langer.

When a troubled

farmer received that sort of attention from the governor of
North Dakota, he was sure to vote for Langer at the next
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election and to repeat the story of his success to his
friends and neighbors.
Langer's emphasis on personal politics led him to a
ruthless use of patronage as governor.

Langer sought and

relished control over favors to North Dakotans.

The

political benefits of granting favors were obvious to
Langer.

At the same time, Langer saw in such activity an

opportunity to mitigate the pernicious effects the large,
impersonal "system" had on the common people.
Like many progressive politicians, Langer never found
it necessary to operate within the bounds of party
discipline.

The interests of the common man transcended

party boundaries.

He developed the NPL into a personal

political machine and cared little to appease the more
conservative Republicans who also nominated him for
.
15
o ff ice.
Although he was a student of the law, Langer had little
faith in the efficacy of law.

His interest in the law was

not that of a scholar but that of an advocate.

Some might

say Langer studied the law only to find out what he could
get by with; it is more likely that his legal activity was
his attempt to bring the results of the actual system of
justice in line with his notion of "absolute justice."

When

confronted by the case of an elderly man who stood to be
hurt badly by Langer's farm foreclosure moratorium, Langer
wrote

11

.we will prepare a modification so that absolute
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justice may be done. 1116

Absolute justice, in Langer's

estimation, was possible only if each case was examined on
its own merits and dealt with according to the dictates of
common sense.

More accurately, "absolute justice" was

justice according to Bill Langer.
Langer's identification of himself with the "common
man" overshadowed his identification of himself with
"absolute justice."

Because he could not conceive of

himself doing anything contrary to the interests of the
common person, he interpreted any attack on himself as an
attack on an entire class of people.

However, he never made

clear who he meant to include in the category of common
people.

In his early races Langer seemed to refer most

often to the farmers who perceived themselves to be the
victims of the large corporations and monopolies.

Later, it

seemed he limited common person status to members of the
Nonpartisan League, and at other times he included all of
the downtrodden people of the world.

No matter who happened

to be included, Langer often deflected criticism of his own
ideas and tactics by charging that the accuser was
committing a wrong against the common people.

Langer's

world was one of good against evil, one which pitted
sinister interests, trusts, and monopolies against the
conunon people and their representative Bill Langer.
Langer first became involved with A. C. Townley's Nonpartisan League when he received the League's endorsement
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for attorney general.

He parted ways with the NPL during

the campaign of 1920 and returned only when he was able to
control the reconstituted League as his own political
machine.
Langer's split with the League is pertinent to the
present study due to his free-wheeling use of "red scare"
tactics to discredit the leadership of the League in the
campaign of 1920.

Although he would later bemoan the

"hysteria" of the McCarthy era, in that earlier time of
.hysteria, Langer did not hesitate to use every possible
method to smear Townley and Lemke with the "red" label.
Langer took the justification for his attacks on
Townley and the League directly from the progressive manual.
The League, Langer claimed, had become elitist, given over
to long-hairs from the east who descended upon North Dakota
to dictate policy to farmers they despised.

In Langer's

rhetoric, the League had become every bit as onerous as the
interests and the monopolies.

The NPL's control of North

Dakota represented a rule of the many by the few.

Although

Langer's attacks on the League were more the result of his
ambitions than his ideology, the rationale of his campaign
was based upon hatred for monopoly and concentration of
power.

His later anti-communism would stern from the same

progressive roots.
Langer developed a tactical philosophy during his early
years in government which was to guide him until his death.
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Once evil was identified, it was to be destroyed by using
every legal and rhetorical device available.

To be soft in

the face of obvious evil was inexcusable.
In the face of so many overwhelming evils in the world,
the rules could be stretched to benefit the downtrodden
"common man."

The ruthless use of patronage, for example,

never seemed to Langer to contradict his otherwise progressive views.
In May of 1941, Langer rose in the Senate to eulogize
another champion of the "common man," Huey Long.

Langer was

probably describing his own aspirations as much as he was
paying tribute when he declared:
It has been said that once or twice in a
generation nature spawns a great commoner--one who
combines the simple, humble, honest virtues of the
common people, the inherent fairness and decency
of the great mass of good folks, their quick anger
at injustice and greed. He was such a man.

The times demanded an "enlightened fighting champion,"
Langer went on to say, and
it was because Huey Long knew how to fight, how
to fight fire with fire, knew how to combat
ruthlessness with ruthlessness, force with force,
and because he had the courage to battle
unceasingly for what he conceived to be right that
he became an inspiration for so many in their own
fight for a square deal, and the object of such
rele~tle
persecution on the part of his
enemies.

17

E N D N O T E S
1. Agnes Geelan, The Dakota Maverick (Fargo,
North Dakota:
Kaye's Printing, 1975), p. 13.
2. Glenn Smith, "William Langer and the Art of
Personal Politics," in The North Dakota Political Tradition,
ed. Thomas Howard, (Ames:
Iowa State University Press,
1981), p. 129. Although Smith does not cite his sources,
his article provides a more credible summation of Langer's
career than does Geelan's The Dakota Maverick.
3.

Ibid., p. 132.

4.

Ibid., p. 134.

5.

Ibid., p. 135.

6.

Ibid., p. 141.

7. Ronald v. Olson, "William Langer's Rise to
Political Prominence in North Dakota" (Master's thesis,
University of North Dakota, 1967), p. 34. Olson's is one of
several theses written at the University of North Dakota
about Langer in the late 1960s following the opening of
Langer's papers to historians.
8. Undated press release, Box 1, Folder 18, The
William L. Langer Papers, The Orin G. Libby Manuscript
Collection, Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special
Collections, Chester Fritz Library, University of North
Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota, henceforth referred to as
the Langer Papers.
9. Campaign literature from the 1920 governor's
race, Box~, Folder 8, Langer Papers.
10.

Smith, "Personal Politics," p. 125.

11.

Ibid., p. 127.

12. Campaign press release, Box 1, Folder 18,
Langer Papers.

22

23

I

I

;i
I

I

13. John M. Holzworth, The Fighting Governor,
(Chicago: The Pointer Press, 1938), p. vii. Holzworth, a
classmate of Langer's at Columbia University, presents a
legendary Langer in this laudatory work, originally written
to promote Langer during the 1938 senatorial campaign.
Surprisingly, Holzworth repeats as fact Langer's false claim
to be the valedictorian of his graduating class at Columbia.
Many of the author's subsequent observations are equally
credulous.
14. Glenn Smith and Walter C. Anhalt, "Who Saved
the Farm? Governor Langer and the Mortgage Moratoria,"
North Dakota Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 4, (Special Issue,
1976): p. 14.
15.

Smith, "Personal Politics," p. 126.

16. Langer to George J. Fischer, 22 June 1933,
Box 37, Folder 5, Langer Papers.
17. u. s. Congressional Record, Senate, 77th
Cong. 1st Sess., 1941, vol. 87, part 3, p. 3323.

II

The Senate's Terrible Mr. Bang

The stormy politics of North Dakota followed William
Langer into the staid chambers of the United States Senate
on January 3, 1941.

As Langer was about to be sworn in,

majority leader Alben Barkley informed him that his seating
in the Senate had been protested by a delegation of North
Dakotans.

Until the charges could be investigated, Langer

was seated "without prejudice."
Langer's case was referred to the Committee on
Privileges and Elections which sent a team of investigators
to North Dakota.

Langer urged North Dakotans to cooperate

with the investigation, and many did, particularly his
political enemies.

So many cooperated that the

investigation lasted for more than a year.

The 4,194 pages

of testimony submitted to the Senate included tales of
Langer's escapades going back 27 years to his days as states
attorney in Morton County.

The grab bag of allegations

included charges that Langer "stole" a drug store,
unlawfully siezed telephone lines, incited a riot in Minot,
defied federal and state courts by calling out the National
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Guard, declared the independence of North Dakota from the
United States, fixed juries, paid the son of a judge who was
trying him in court, engaged in several questionable land
and stock deals, and blackmailed state employees into
contributing to the Nonpartisan League.
In the end, the debate on the floor of the Senate
became confused and it is likely that Senators who voted for
Langer's seating were merely questioning the Senate's right
to pass such a judgement, not registering approval of
Langer's character or excusing his past behavior.

In fact,

Langer gleefully agreed to many of the charges and sometimes
embellished them when he found that the investigators had
left out colorful details.

During the floor debate, Langer

punctiliously pointed out trivial errors of fact and occasionally interrupted to help Senators find the correct page
numbers of portions of the testimony.
Langer's unrepentant, proud attitude befuddled his
closest advisors.

At a time when humility was expected, he

defiantly chomped on his unlit, still-wrapped cigar.

The

controversy did not end until March of 1942 when the Senate,
after weeks of debate, rejected the recommendation of the
comrnitLee (which had voted 13-3 to deny Langer a seat on
grounds of "moral turpitude") and seated him by a vote of
52-30.
Langer was able to act as a Senator during his year of
limbo, and he quickly established the patterns which were to
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characterize his career in the upper chamber.

He inserted

reams of letters and editorials from North Dakotans into the
Congressional Record.
vate bills.

He began to introduce numerous pri-

He was aware that he was at the mercy of his

fellow senators, however, and did not yet begin his tactics
of obstruction and delay on the Senate floor.
From his seat in the Senate, Langer was able to use
correspondence more effectively as a political instrument
than ever before.

After the United States became involved

in World War II, many North Dakotans had complaints about
their treatment at the hands of the many wartime boards and
agencies.

Langer's reputation for addressing individual

complaints led many to write him seeking furloughs or
outright discharges from the armed forces and exemptions
from the draft.

Thousands more wrote in attempts to cut

through the layers of bureaucracy surrounding the rationing
of machinery, tires, gasoline, radio batteries, sugar, even
shotgun shells.

II

.Every place I asked what can be done

they tell me it takes Senator Langer to get anything done,"
observed a petitioner from Elgin, North Dakota.

1

A Mr.

Albrecht who was refused a spare tire for his car wrote, "I
told Mr. Thompson [head of the rationing board] that if I
don't get my tire I am going to write Bill Langer."

On the

strength of that threat alone, the board issued Albrecht a
certificate for a spare the next day.

2
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It is not clear whether Langer's storied reputation for
successfully resolving complaints and for filling requests
is deserved.

Some soldiers were furloughed, a few received

discharges, and many were exempted from the draft.

These

soldiers and their families often wrote effusive letters of
thanks giving credit to ·Langer.

However, a great majority

of the requests for a release from duty were denied.

Many

farmers received machinery, tires, and more generous
gasoline rations following Langer's actions, but it is
difficult to establish exactly what influence Langer had on
the final result.
In most cases, Langer simply forwarded the constituent's letter to the appropriate government agency and asked
them to "see what they could do" to address the problem.
Subsequent letters to constituents were carefully crafted to
convey the impression that Langer had taken up the case, but
only when obvious injustices were done did Langer employ the
full force of his explosive rhetoric in a letter to an
agency.
One such case involved a recent German immigrant,
August Bauer.

After ransacking his home, the FBI accused

Bauer of sqowing an inordinate interest in troop movements
through Jamestown and of committing "moral indiscretions"
with his secretary.

To protect national security, Bauer was

interred at Fort Lincoln.

Bauer wrote Langer, and after

receiving the FBI report, Langer wrote to J. Edgar Hoover

28

and offered to appear on Bauer's behalf.

Although Hoover

did not respond directly to Langer's offer, Bauer was
quickly released.

3

Langer's effectiveness in resolving the thousands of
complaints which came his way during World War II cannot be
accurately gauged.

It is certain, however, that through the

careful use of these thousands of grievances he was able to
expand his personal political base.

Langer was indis-

criminate in whom he helped and delighted in treating the
requests of his political enemies with as much interest as
he treated the complaints of his political cronies.

How

could a farmer, Republican or Democrat, not vote for a man
who, it seemed at least, had pulled the right strings to get
a combine delivered to the farm just in time for the
harvest?
Langer employed many methods of using a constituent's
correspondence to make the writer feel important.

Hundreds,

probably thousands of his replies began, "I can't tell you
how long it has been since I received such a fine letter as
yours."

It did not matter that many of the requests from

constituents were written on the back of envelopes or shabby
notepads.

One barely legible note contained a simple

request:

"Dear Bill, Please see what you can do about

getting me an alarm clock. 114

In this case as in many

others, there was nothing Chester Bowles, the Director of
the Office of Price Administration, or any of the other
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agency heads Langer wrote could do to solve the problem.

In

the end, however, the farmer had a handful of letters to
prove that for one moment at least, the attention of Washington had been riveted on his lack of an alarm clock.
Langer quickly discovered that the Congressional Record
provided an unparalled opportunity to make North Dakotans
feel as though a national audience heard their views and
complaints.

When Langer inserted a letter from a constit-

uent into the Record, he would later write the author of the
letter a note, claiming that the letter was "so important"
that he had placed it in the Record for all senators to
read.

When he inserted editorials from weekly small-town

newspapers in the Record, he could be assured that the
entire readership of the paper would feel honored, to say
nothing of the editor.
Organizations often would send Langer suggested
resolutions and he would introduce them, even if one
contradicted a resolution from another group which Langer
would introduce at the same time.

It did not matter that

the resolutions were inevitably dead-on-arrival when
referred to committee.

It was important only that Langer

could write the group that theirs was such a fine resolution
that he had decided to introduce it on the floor of the
Senate.
Langer would stop at nothing to give one of his
constituents a sense of importance.

In a state beleagured
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by a sense of inferiority, there could be no better campaign
tool.

In a state with as small a population as North

Dakota's, it was not difficult to build a loyal political
base through the skillful use of constituent correspondence.
Langer rarely disagreed openly with the content of letters
that came to him from North Dakota, no matter what views the
constituent expressed.

Even virulently racist letters did

not stir Langer, as long as they came from his home state.
Langer responded to an violently anti-Semetic letter from a
Fargo resident with a letter which, although it did not
repeat any of the specific claims made by the constituent,
began by stating, "You are so absolutely right in your
letter of November 28, that it is pitiful even to answer
1.

t

•

.. 5
Langer's propensity to grant individual exceptions to

his edicts as governor translated in the Senate into an
unending stream of private bills "for the relief of"
individual people, particularly refugees and other aliens
seeking to get into the United States or to be considered
for citizenship.

When a constituent suggested a change in

the immigration laws, Langer wrote, "It has always been my
position that orphans, refugees, escapees and expellees may
best be helped by the enactment of separate, emergency
refugee legislation . . . rather than by amending our basic
immigration law. 116

After Langer was seated in March of 1942, he turned
more attention to debates on the floor of the Senate.
Langer knew his fate was no longer in the hands of his
fellow senators, and he immediately began to take advantage
of the rules of the Senate to obstruct bills that he did not
like and to promote causes dear to his heart.
In 1943 Langer gave a full view of what the Senate
would come to expect of "the terrible Mr. Bang," as
columnist Drew Pearson labelled him.

7

In April of that year

he issued a messianic cry for a nation-wide revival of the
Nonpartisan League to oppose the two established parties
which he insisted were run by the "interests. 118

The

project fell flat, but that did not prevent Langer from
demanding an investigation of the Republican convention of
1940, which he claimed nominated Wendell Willkie at the
behest of none other than Harry Hopkins.

9

The Senate got its first taste of a Lariger temper
tantrum in 1943 when Senator Joseph Guffy of Pennsylvania,
while engaged in a dispute with a South Dakota senator,
mistakenly attacked corruption in North Dakota instead of
South Dakota.

When Langer corrected him at length, Guffy

said that he did not need to discuss corruption in Langer's
home state because it was already so evident, and that

11
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would not be surprised if today some of the Senators who
voted in favor of seating the Senator would, if they had the
opportunity, reconsider the vote they cast to seat him.

1110
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Such a gratuitous attack sent Langer into orbit.

He

obtained the floor and launched into a virulent diatribe
against Guffy, charging, among other allegations, that a
Guffy aide had violently raped a woman and that Guffy had
full knowledge of the rape but did nothing.

When finished

with the Pennsylvanian, ·Langer moved back to his own career
in North Dakota politics, which he recalled in lengthy
detail.
Attempts to get Langer to yield failed, and when
Senator Thomas Connally of Texas attempted to trick Langer
into giving up the floor by calling him aside and whispering
into his ear while a second senator claimed that Langer had
stopped talking, the presiding officer returned the floor to
Langer.

When Langer subsequently refused to yield to

Connally, the Texas Senator said, "The Senator was quite
willing to yield a year or two ago," referring to Langer's
relative tameness before the Senate voted to seat him.

11

It was the method to Langer's madness that most
irritated his fellow Senators:

claiming ill health, Langer

managed to get permission from the presiding officer of the
Senate to have the clerk read his speech while he sat.

When

the speech.deteriorated into the reading of a stream of
newspaper and magazine articles about the 1940 election, it
become apparent that Langer had devised an ingenious method
of filibuster.

When an exasperated Senator Scott Lucas of

Illinois asked the presiding officer if the clerk could be
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compelled to read until "he is out of breath," the officer
replied that nothing in the rules could limit the length of
time to be taken.

12

Although Langer usually had to read his own speeches
from that time on, he devised many other ways of obstructing
the business of the Senate.

One of his favorite methods was

to derail debate on a bill to which he was opposed by
introducing an irrelevant, yet controversial amendment.
Thus, when in 1948 Langer opposed the repeal on the tax on
oleomargerine, a measure which would have hurt North Dakota
dairy farmers, he did so by adding a lengthy anti-lynching
bill as an amendment.

It did not matter to Langer that the

amendment was an exact replica of a bill that had been
introduced separately, and that the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, B'nai Brith, and other
civil rights organizations deplored Langer's use of civil
rights to obstruct other bills.

Langer's strategy was not

so much to have the amendment passed, but to see if he could
spawn a filibuster by luring the Senate into debating one of
his amendments.
In June 1948 Langer sought to slow the passage of a
defense appropriations bill by introducing a series of civil
rights amendments ranging from one prohibiting the poll tax
to one prohibiting the armed forces from doing business with
contractors using discriminatory hiring practices.

When one

of these threatened to stir debate, Senator Lucas stood up

to remind the Senate that there was a "general understanding" that Senators were to "submerge their convictions"
on civil rights to prevent a filibuster.

The Senate

leadership had prepared for Langer's tactics on this
occasion, but they had not prepared enough.

Langer's final

anti-discrimination amendment stirred a long debate until it
was finally passed, only to be reconsidered and later
defeated.

Langer had succeeded.

The business of the Senate

had been disrupted, and nobody doubted Langer's opposition
to the defense appropriations bill.

13

Another defense appropriations bill provided Langer an
opportunity for further mischief in 1951.

After the Senate

passed an amendment to cut the defense appropriation by 2.5
percent, Langer decided that the time might be right for
deeper cuts and offered an amendment to slash the appropriation by 50 percent.

Infuriated that a 2.5 percent cut

was brought to a vote while his 50 percent cut was ruled out
of order, Langer decided to find out just what decrease
would be acceptable to the presiding officer.

He tried a 40

percent cut, but it was ruled out of order, as was a 30
percent cut and a 20 percent cut.
He then tried a new tack.

Instead of cutting the

defense budget, why not make sure some of the funds went
towards useful projects?

One by one, Langer offered

amendments to use five billion dollars of defense funds to
provide telephone service ·for poor farmers, to provide

,,1'
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amendments to use five billion dollars of defense funds to
provide telephone service for poor farmers, to provide
student loans for those who had been rejected by the Armed
Forces and were thus disqualified from receiving the
benefits of the GI Bill, to provide free urinalysis for all
citizens (with a limit of one test per six months), and to
provide for the construction of elevator facilities to store
surplus grain.

All the amendments were rejected, as was

another that proposed to use defense funds for the
construction of a four-lane interstate highway system.

''It

seems to me that no better defense could be provided our
country than would be provided by good roads," Langer said,
without realizing that only a few years would pass before
the Eisenhower administration would fall in line with his
proposal.

But Langer was not serious; he gleefully agreed

to a modification of the amendment by Senator Russell Long
of Louisiana which stipulated that two of the proposed
highways cross the state of North Dakota, and the amendment

.
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Although Langer's filibustering seemed to accomplish
little, it served several of his purposes:

He was

obstructing a bill to which he was opposed at the same time
that he was promoting his pet projects.

In addition, Langer

could solemnly write his constituents informing them of the
introduction of his various high-sounding amendments without
mentioning that his measures had not been taken seriously by
the Senate.

On June 10, 1948, Langer announced that he would object to
any and every bill put forward by the Senate.

His committee

had worked for two years on a bill to provide maternity
leave for government employees, Langer protested, only to
have a member of the committee block the bill by objecting
to it.

Therefore, "so long as we cannot take care of poor

defenseless women, I shall object to every bill.

1115

After

the presiding officer lamented that there was really no use
calling the calendar "as long as the Senator objects en bloc
to all subsequent bills, 1116

Senator John Williams of

Delaware, the senator guilty of blocking the maternity leave
bill, rose to protest.

If Langer had been at all serious in

trying to pass the bill, Williams said, he would have made
an attempt to follow the proper procedures in the
committee.

17

Sufficiently shamed, Langer sat down.

As was

so often the case, Langer's proposals were doomed by the
ineptness of their construction and by his apparent lack of
sincerity.
In January of 1949, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon,
himself a noted filibuster artist, proposed a cloture rule
that was clearly aimed at Langer.

Although he opposed the

bill, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia said "if it takes a
thief to catch a thief," Morse was the one to put a stop to
tactics of delay and obstruction.

18

After discovering that

the new rule would include limits to debate on amendments,
Langer rose in indignation.

He was opposed, he said, to
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anything designed" . . . to keep a Senator from a small
state from laying bare upon the floor of the Senate the
feelings of the people of his state. 1119

When Senator

William Knowland of California charged that Stalin must have
been happy with Langer's attempts to stop the peacetime
draft through the use of a filibuster, Langer exploded that
he had done "nothing that even savors of a filibuster," and
that he was merely quoting the views of "church after
church, Rotary clubs, the Farmer's Union, and boards of
higher education." He was only doing his duty, he claimed,
by "bringing to the attention of the Senate the views of the
people of his state.

1120

Langer's tantrums became commonplace and were easily
provoked.

Langer delighted in teasing other Senators into

believing that he was about to begin a tirade.

He would

then watch in glee as his colleagues scrambled to appease
him before it was too late.

In the early years, Senators

not yet trained in the art of handling "Wild Bill 11 often
made grave mistakes that cost hours upon hours of the
Senate's time.

By 1951, however, it seemed that his fellow

senators had learned that the best way to get Langer to sit
down was to humor him through effusive compliments or to
join in his "opera bouffe," as one senator labelled one of
Langer's shows. 21

Many senators seemed to share the

attitude of Senator Herman Welker of Idaho:

"The Senator

[Langer] has spent his adult lifetime serving the people of

North Dakota.

Whether we like it or not, the people of

North Dakota like it. 1122
Langer's shenanigans usually did little more than
disrupt Senate bu~iness.

Occasionally, however, they

brought the institution a good deal of shame.

Such was the

case in March of 1949 when Langer's hatred of Winston
Churchill caused an incident that left many a senator
embarrassed.

When Churchill visited the United States in

March of 1949, Langer charged on the Senate floor that
Churchill, a "cunning hypocrite," a fascist and a "coldblooded foreign propagandist" had "done all he could" to
defeat the United States in the Spanish-American war.

23

In

a wire sent to Senator Connally the next day, Churchill said
"The statement made by Mr. Langer is entirely devoid of the
truth."

Churchill had been to Cuba, but left the island two

years before fighting between the Americans and the Spanish
broke out. 24

Langer was berated by many newspapers for the

irresponsible charges, even by those publications
traditionally friendly to him.

But nothing would dissuade

Langer from repeating the charges with even more lurid
rhetoric the next day, adding the allegation that Churchill
had started the Cold War at Fulton, Missouri.

25

In 1952, Langer welcomed Churchill back to the United
States by suggesting in a widely publicized telegram to the
rector of the Old North Church that two lanterns be hung in
the belfry of the "hallowed edifice."

Just as Paul Revere

warned the colonists that the British were coming, "
our fellow countrymen should be equally warned and alerted
today."

26

The ploy earned Langer a great many letters of

praise from constituents and other citizens from across the
nation who were equally suspicious of the British prime
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One of Langer's pet projects in the Senate was the
promotion of North Dakotans for federal appointments.

He

repeatedly extolled the virtues of North Dakotans on the
Senate floor and noted the lack of federal appointees from
North Dakota.

To get his point across, Langer often

filibustered routine confirmations of presidential
appointments.

His methods varied.

After objecting to the

nomination of one William Jennings Bryan (no apparent
relation to the politician) to the post of customs collector
in District 27 of California, Langer noted that President
Truman had appointed nobody from North Dakota and proceeded
to list hundreds of appointees from other states.

28

Langer later bemoaned the lack of a cabinet level
appointee from North Dakota.

To emphasize his point, Langer

went through all of the cabinet posts, listing for each the
states that had at one time or another had a native son
appointed to the post.

At other times, he would merely read

biographical sketches of North Dakota citizens he thought
qualified for federal service, or biographies of great North
Dakotans of the past.

29
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Many of Langer's statements on the Senate floor
stretched credulity to its limits.

When Senator Olin

Johnston of South Carolina charged that the Indians of North
Dakota were as unqualified to govern due to their lack of
education as were the blacks of South Carolina, Langer
retorted that over half of the Indians of North Dakota had
degrees from Harvard, Yale, Columbia, or the University of
North Dakota.

30

Such wild exaggerations were commonplace

for Langer and were rarely refuted by other Senators.
To the extent that Langer cooperated with anyone on the
floor of the Senate, he worked most closely with other
Senators who were outside of the Senate's inner club.

Upon

Langer's death in 1959, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, a
prominent Senate outsider, said, "After I became a member of
the Senate, there was no member of this body with whom I had
closer association or stronger ties than with Senator
Langer.'' 31

Hubert Humphery and Langer humored each other as

friendly rivals from adjacent states on the floor of the
Senate before Humphery became accepted as a member of the
Senate elite.

Towards the end of Langer's career, however,

Humphery's presidential ambitions and constant mailings to
Langer's office had begun to grate on the increasingly
cranky North Dakotan.

32

Wayne Morse of Oregon, as

dedicated a non-conformist as Langer and every bit as
cantankerous, often rose in Langer's defense and seemed to
regard Langer as something of a mentor.

33

Margaret Chase
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Smith and Langer were on friendly terms throughout Langer's
time in the Senate, sharing an interest in the direct
popular election of the president and the rights of women.
Smith offered to campaign for Langer in 1958, but Langer did
not mount a campaign in that, his final election.

34

Langer had as little regard for party loyalty in the
Senate as he had had in his eaily career.

When criticized

for a lack of party loyalty in January 1951, Langer gave his
views towards the Republican party, of which he was little
more than a nominal member.

" . . . I owe the Republican

party in North Dakota absolutely nothing, 1135

he fumed,

adding later that "The regular Republican party is not
interested in William Langer.

I am a branch of it myself,

the farmer-labor branch of the Republican party . . . 1136

In

1947 Langer informed the Senate that if a bill to amend the
Civil Service Retirement Act did not pass, he would advise
.
· 37
cons t.1 t uents t o vote Democratic.
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In debate on the Senate floor, Langer was as likely to
direct his venom against the Republican party as he was
against the Democrats.

In February 1951, he railed against

the Democratic-controlled Congress for taking so long to
pass legislation providing money to fight the Korean War.
The Democrats should have no problem passing such a law
overnight, Langer insisted, since "every time they have been
in office there has been a war. 1138

Nevertheless, only three

months later Langer attacked the Republicans for having "the

consummate gall to rise and say that the Democrats are the
war party. 1139
Langer seemed unconcerned that his defiance of party
ties would hamper his effectiveness as a legislator in the
tradition-bound United States Senate.

Only rarely did

legislation other than private bills authored by Langer pass
the Senate, and the private bills passed unquestioned on the
strength of senatorial courtesy.

He did not need the

Republican party in the Senate because he had no serious
legislative goals.

He did not need the Republican party in

North Dakota because his constituency there was based upon
personal, not party, ties.
Langer was perfectly willing, however, to accept the
spoils of the seniority system when he was the senior member
of the Republican party on the Judiciary Committee in 1952.
The Republicans took control of the Senate in that year's
election, and Langer was to become the chairman of the
powerful committee.

Senator Knowland, no friend of

Langer's, called for an exception to the seniority system to
exclude Langer from the chairmanship, but other Senators
were wary that the entire pecking order would collapse and
allowed Langer to take control.

The position was to give

Langer what Time magazine called "nuisance leverage. 1140
Langer's first year at the helm of the important
committee went smoothly.

An Eisenhower administration

official went so far as to say that "Bill has been mellowed

by time and responsibility. 1141

Some even called him "Mild

Bill."
But Knowland's worst fears were confirmed in 1954 when
the nomination of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United
States had to pass through Langer's Judiciary Committee.
Although Langer steadfastly denied the charges, the national
media and most of his fellow senators accused him of
unnecessarily delaying Warren's nomination for well over a
month.

Langer insisted upon airing a series of questionable

letters charging that Warren was a communist and that he had
allowed organized crime to establish its headquart~rs in
California.

He also took the unprecedented step of

requesting an FBI investigation into Warren's past.
The explanation of Langer's actions was simple:
Eisenhower had snubbed Langer by not seeking the North
Dakota senator's approval of several federal appointments in
the state, including a judgeship and several postmaster
positions.

Langer guarded his power of patronage most

jealously, and the media and other members of the Senate
assumed that the delay of the Warren nomination was in
'
h ower I s 1nsens1t1v1
•
•
•
• t
revenge f or Eisen
y. 42

Such charges sent Langer into a rage.

He took to the

Senate floor to defend himself against what he perceived to
be an attack on his integrity.

Almost with pride, he

inserted many editorials protesting his delay tactics into
the Congressional Record.

There was no deliberate delay,

according to Langer.

He was only doing his job by

investigating every charge, and he was staying up late at
night despite his ill health to do so.

Langer contended

that the delay was due to the number of objections filed
against Warren and that if Eisenhower had nominated a jurist
instead of a politician there would have been fewer such
.
.
43
o b Jections.

Langer's "thoroughness" was defended by Senators Morse,
Long, and Kefauver, but other senators were furious.
Knowland renewed his efforts to remove Langer from the chair
of the Judiciary Committee.
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Langer had supported Warren in his unsuccessful
presidential campaign of 1952 and was personally acquainted
with the future Chief Justice.
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But Langer would go to

almost any length to defend his patronage privileges, even
if that meant he had to call into question the integrity of
a man he knew to be innocent.
National magazines had singled out Langer as one of the
worst senators long before the Warren affair.

"A lone-wolf,

incapable of cooperation, 63-year-old Langer has probably
introduced more trivial bills than any other Senator,"
reported a Time article in 1950 listing the eight "most
expendable" senators.
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·
. 1 e i. n t h e
Accor d ing
to a 1 ater artic

magazine, Langer had a reputation "for being long on wind
and trivial proposals, short on judgement and
accomplishment; he was on.almost all lists of the ten worst

Senators. 1147

Time earlier had referred to Langer as the

"beady-eyed" Senator from North Dakota.
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U. S. News was befuddled by Langer's plan to enter law
practice to finance a Senate anti-monopoly investigation in
1954.

"He has to do it that way, he says, because the

Senate leadership stalled his request for $37,500 for
committee operations . . . Old-timers around the Capitol
cannot recollect a similar instance in the past."

According

to the magazine, "Langer frequently is involved in unusual
.situations."

His imposition of the legally questionable

grain embargo as governor was cited as but one example of
. unpre d'icta b·1·
h is
i ity.
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Of the national magazines, The Saturday Evening Post
printed the most serious attempt to understand Langer.
Because Langer had become chairman of the Judiciary
Committee and could therefore no longer be ignored, the Post
sent its Washington editor Beverly Smith to North Dakota in
1954, soon after Langer was accused of being a part of an
alien smuggling racket.

Smith's lengthy and comprehensive

article provides one of the most insightful investigations
of Langer's personality available to this day.

Even so, she

was frustrated by her subject and called her article a
"feeble attempt" to understand the tumultuous senator.
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After 1954, Langer faded from the national scene until
his death in 1959, thus escaping further criticism.

After

his death, however, Newsweek spoke of Langer's ability to
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raise "unskirted hell on the floor of the

u.

S. Senate."

In

addition, "Except on farm and foreign policy, he seemed to
have no consistent philosophy."

The only tribute the

magazine could muster was to say that"

in a time of

political conformity, the Senate lost one of its most
dedicated non-conformists. 1151
Langer seemed to derive just as much satisfaction from
criticism as he did from praise.

If he was criticized in

the editorials of national news magazines, he was sure to
insert the articles into the Record.

A North Dakota report-

er who covered many Langer campaigns wrote, "He appeared
happiest when his actions startled people.

Generally he

seemed to take the attitude that all publicity, even if
unfavorable, was good publicity. 1152
When William Langer entered the Senate, he entered an
office conducive to the efficient development of a personal
constituency.

But despite his increasing support in North

Dakota, Langer's days of effectiveness as a government
official were over.

From 1940 on his only contributions to

the formation of public policy would be wind and noise.
In addition to Langer's remarkable memory for names and
energy for campaigning, he succeeded in expanding his
support in North Dakota during his undistinguished Senate
career for three reasons:

First, his reputation for "get-

ting things done'' on behalf of his constituents grew to the
level of myth.

Second, his unabashed, eloquent defenses of
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North Dakota gave the citizens of the state a feeling of
pride and a sense that their interests were protected in
Washington.

Third, Langer so identified himself with his

home state that he was able to present an attack on himself
as an attack on the people of North Dakota.

Any criticism

of him by the national or even the regional media thus
worked to his own benefit.
Langer never made the transition from being a lawyer in
the wild west to being a legislator in Washington.
no patience for the legislative process.

He had

It had been

difficult enough for him to cope with the limits on his
power in the governor's office in Bismarck.

It was

impossible for him to cooperate or compromise with his
fellow senators in Washington.
Towards the end of Langer's career, the anger many
senators felt towards him during his early years in the
Senate dissipated and was replaced by mere exasperation.

It

was apparent that Langer had used his "talent for friendship" to win over many of his early detractors in the same
way that he won over North Dakota voters, and by the time of
his death, Langer's colleagues admired him for his
humanitarianism and friendliness.
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III
Langer:

A Humanitarian Liberal?

It would be possible to ~xamine William Langer's record
in the Senate and conclude that he was a consistent and
perpetual advocate of human rights and civil liberties.

A

perusal of the index to the Congressional Record shows that
from the time he went to Washington in 1941 until his death
in 1959, Langer was sympathetic to a wide variety of liberal
causes.

Indeed, given the nature of some of his proposals,

it is possible to argue that Langer was many years ahead of
his time.
In the realm of civil rights, Langer consistently
pressed for equality for blacks.

It would be difficult to

accuse him of doing so in order to gain votes:

North

Dakota's black population numbered only in the hundreds, and
for most North Dakotans, civil rights was not a pressing
issue in the 1940's and early 1950's.

His support for

racial justice for all ethnic minorities was consistent
throughout his entire career in the Senate.
In 1943 Langer protested discriminatory hiring
practices in the navy shipyards.
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In a long speech on the
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Senate floor, Langer recited the heroics of black men in
stories taken from what he called the "then uncensored"
press of 1941, and expressed outrage that black federal
employees, despite their competence, were still treated
unfairly.

1

Later in the same month, Langer introduced a bill to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of color in the WAVES.
"With the WAACs and WAVEs fighting for four freedoms all
over the world," he observed, "how strange it is that there
should be the necessity here in the United States for a bill
of this character. 112
Later, Langer proposed that Federal aid to public
schools be tied to the elimination of discrimination on the
basis of race, creed, or color.

He cited statistics from an

unnamed state which allegedly provided schools $66.21 per
white student and $12.62 for each black student.

3

In 1945,

Langer introduced a bill to prohibit any college or University that, in the opinion of the United States Commissioner
of Education, "in any manner discriminates against any
person on account of race, color, or creed, or on account of
his views with respect to such discrimination, or in any way
attempts to prevent or restrain the freedom of expression of
such views by any person" from receiving federal funds.

4

In 1948, Langer stated that " . . . There is more
discrimination against Negroes today than at any time since
the turn of the century."

5
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Langer and Senator Olin Johnston of South Carolina
sparred over racial matters in the spring of 1949.

Had

Johnston done anything while governor of his state to permit
the Negro to vote?

The southerner replied that he had not.

Was Johnston a white supremacist, and if so, why?

John-

ston's position was that he merely favored a system in which
those who were most qualified to rule were in control of the
government.

Would Langer want North Dakota's Indians to

have too much control?

6

Johnston's refusal to help the blacks in his state
stood in contrast to Langer's consistent work on behalf of
the Indians of North Dakota throughout his entire career.
From the time when Langer broke into the Fort Yates jail to
confer with five Indians he was to defend successfully in a
murder trial until his last days in the Senate he worked to
help individual Indians whom he believed had been wronged by
"the system."

As usual, however, Langer's help was limited

to individual cases and his effective legislation was
limited to private bills.

The bills he introduced to

require that the Bureau of Indian Affairs be headed by an
Indian and his proposals to grant reservations greater selfgovernment were not serious attempts to change the law.
Despite his refusal to disagree with anti-Semetic
letters he received from constituents, it is difficult to
charge Langer with anti-Semitism.

In 1943, Langer delivered

a long speech on the Senate floor in favor of a Jewish
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homeland in Palestine and in favor of Jewish representation
in the future United Nations.

He qualified his support for

a new Isreal, however, by adding that any state developed
for the Jewish people would have to allow "the full civic
and religious rights to the non-Jewish inhabitants of
Palestine . . . 117
Langer's belief in the equality of all races led him to
introduce many bills that would admit displaced persons into
the United States without regard to their nationality. 8

He

opposed racially based immigration quotas as well, but his
support for an equitable immigration policy was limited to
the introduction of sweeping, simplistic bills.
Langer was a consistent advocate for those who were
persecuted for their religious beliefs during World War II.
He defended Jehovah's Witnesses who claimed that they were
abused while incarcerated for concientious refusal to serve
in the armed forces.

In 1949, Langer introduced a resolu-

tion urging the President to pardon all convicted for their
refusal to serve during World War II due to their religious
.

.

convictions.

9

According to the index of the Congressional Record,
Langer annually introduced a constitutional amendment to
provide equal rights for women.

He also introduced or

supported legislation to abolish poll taxes, to prevent the
lynching of Indians, to prevent the lynching of blacks in
the armed forces, to provide jobs for the handicapped, to

provide for German war orphans, provide financial relief for
all persons detained as enemy aliens, to remove racial restrictions on naturalization, to permit Indians to select
the commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to
prohibit child labor, to prevent the use of animals in
experimentation, to provide maternity leave for federal
employees, to regulate the use of wire-tapping and listening
devices, to provide for the direct election of the
President, to establish a national Infantile Paralysis
.clinic, to provide aid to crippled veterans, to increase the
benefits of serviceman's dependents, to prevent the drafting
of fathers, to provide maternity care for wives of enlisted
men, to prevent discrimination against blacks in Washington
D. C. restaurants, to provide special parcel post rates for
the blind, to abolish the Electoral College, to provide
stools for all postal clerks, to establish a federal agency
for the handicapped, to establish a federal advisory
committee for the blind, to fund cancer research, to provide for libraries in rural areas, to encourage world disarmament, and to prohibit the production of nuclear
weapons.

10

The titles of his proposed bills make an impressive
list, but Langer was no Hubert Humphery.

Langer's bills

were simplistically worded and not designed to pass.

At

best they were intended to appear as a statement of Langer's
ideals and at their worst they were designed to look good in
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a letter to a constituent.

Furthermore, it did not matter

to Langer that existing law rendered some of his measures
unnecessary.
Most of his civil rights proposals were not serious
attempts to pass effective legislation but rather were
introduced as amendments to agriculture or defense measures
in an attempt to kill or at least delay the passage of bills
Langer did not like.

Although there is no question that

Langer believed in racial equality, his civil rights
proposals were mischievous attempts to derail Senate debate
by broaching the most controversial topic possible.
Langer succeeded.

Often,

For example, he often introduced anti-

lynching bills as obstructive amendments to agriculture
bills.

Langer objected fiercely to a bill to repeal the tax

on oleomargerine, for example, and responded by attempting
to amend the bill to prevent lynching.

11

Although he

received the support of some civil rights groups and the
admiration of many supporters of civil rights groups, others
rightly accused him of using civil rights as a political
tool.

Senators who dared point out that anti-lynching

legislation had little to do with oleomargerine taxes were
treated to long, indignant diatribes attempting to prove the
opposite.
His proposals on behalf of other disadvantaged minorities were no more serious.

Langer seemed incapable of

constructing a bill that was worded in such a way that it
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would have a chance of passage.

Although the titles of his

proposals are impressive as they appear in the index to the
Congressional Record, the text of the bills is inevitably
simplistic and naive.

The man identified by many of his

colleagues as the senator most concerned with the plight of.
children seemed himself ·to be possessed of a childlike faith
that the world's problems could be solved by a series of
simple decrees.
Upon further analysis, most of Langer's humanitarian
efforts in the Senate take on the character of the bill he
introduced in June 1945 to require that 10 percent of all
major league baseball players be returning veterans missing

. b s. 12
one or more 1 im

Proposals such as this one were often

comic and seemed to mock the very people Langer professed to
want

to help.
Others of Langer's liberal and civil libertarian views

have been regarded with satisfaction by liberals of today.
Langer was suspicious of the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency, for example, and in 1949 sought to
limit the duties CIA agents could perform while in the
United States.

Although he might vote alone, Langer said,

he would not stand by while a "gestapo" was established in
the United States "by which people may be hounded by a
central bureau."

13

Langer opposed most military spending.

Those who were

in favor of large military expenditures following World War
I
t
t

L
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II, were simply "hysterical with fear," he charged.
Military funds, Langer went on to say, are by definition
wasted, while money spent on domestic programs brings
returns.
draft.

14

Langer also consistently opposed the military

15

When the Supreme Court's Harris decision broadened the
right of search, Langer immediately introduced a bill to
strengthen the laws against illegal search and seizure. 16
In 1953, Langer was the only member of the Senate
Judiciary Committee to oppose a bill designed to help
congressional investigating panels force witnesses to answer
questions.

The bill was a direct blow to the Fifth Amend-

ment, but Langer opposed it because it granted immunity from
prosecution for any offense mentioned in the hearing.

Such

immunity, Langer contended, would encourage criminals to
broaden their testimony to enlarge their immunity. 17
Langer had long been opposed to the type of tactics
that characterized the witch hunts of the McCarthy era.

In

1942 he had mocked the Dies Committee's "guilt-by association" tactics and disputed the notion that communists needed
to be outlawed.

"In North Dakota, we did not do as some

other states have done, namely pass a law prohibiting a
communist column on the ballot," he declared.

"On the

contrary, we had an investigation made to find out why a man
would vote communist, and it did not take long to discover
the reasons."

Hunger, poverty, and hardship put people in a
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position where they would "vote almost any kind of

. k e.
t .. is
t 1C
In July 1950, Karl Mundt of South Dakota maintained on
the Senate floor that a train wreck in Missouri was caused
by "subversive elements."

When authorities revealed that i_n

fact a prank by a group ·of boys had caused the accident,
Langer reprimanded the South Dakotan:

"It all goes to show

how that in a time of hysteria, anything which may happen
anywhere in the U.

s.,

no matter how bad, may be blamed on

some organization or person who is not at all guilty . . .

1119

The broad sweep of the hunt for subversives troubled
Langer.

"What about the peaceful advocacy of socialism?" he

asked his fellow senators, wondering if they could find any
American more loyal than the head of the Socialist Party,
Norman Thomas.

20

Loyalty boards appointed by the President were not
consistent with the American conception of justice, Langer
maintained, adding that such work was what the courts were
for. 21

Bills against subversives were "the product of

hysteria and frantic, unthinking fear" and struck at the
foundation of American democratic institutions because they
"required proof of no overt act or evil intent.

1122

The

Nixon-Mundt bill proposed in 1950 to control un-American and
subversive activities would, in Langer's words, "declare
guilt by legislative fiat. 1123

Langer added that "this bill,
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if enacted, would constitute the greatest threat to civil
liberties since the alien and sedition laws of 1798.

1124

Langer often defended those who he felt were denied a
fair hearing when accused of subversion.

Although dis-

claiming any connection to a group of New York communists on
trial for subversion, Langer said, "

.in America a

murderer, a Communist, a Democrat, or a Republican, a
smuggler or a bank robber, under the Constitution of the
United States is entitled to a square deal when he goes into
court."

The judge in this particular case, according to

Langer, had "hand-picked" the jury to obtain a conviction.

25

Langer tied his arguments for racial equality to the
issues of the Cold War.

If the United States government was

effectively to oppose communism abroad, Langer argued that
it needed to protect liberties and the rights of minorities
at home.

"God only knows," he charged, "we have departed

far enough from these sacred principles of reasoned and
decent human conduct on the domestic scene. 1126

But Langer

was also aware that the United States was not alone in this
regard; the behavior in Africa of the England he hated was
serving to drive blacks there "into the arms of the
Soviets," he said in 1948.

27

Communism was a threat, but the measures taken to
combat communism were a larger threat.

"

According to Langer,

. our American way of life is threatened whenever

freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, or
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freedom of worship is denied any group of persons in our
land."28

To Langer, measures such as the Internal Security

Act of 1950 threatened traditional American liberties.
Many of Langer's impassioned pleas for the preservation
of American liberties were not issued as a part of the
debate over a particular bill but in response to attacks,
real or imagined, upon groups near and dear to Langer's
heart.

When the Farmer's Union of North Dakota was labeled

by a Senator from New Hampshire as a "communist front,"

Langer took the floor in protest, inserted enough articles
and chapters of books in favor of the Farmer's Union to fill
35 pages of the Congressional Record, and then launched into
a long discussion of America's democratic ideals.

29

In 1950, an attack on the Farmer's Union provided
Langer with an opportunity to issue a characteristic protest
against the guilt-by association mood of the time:

"I know

of no law which provides that a Communist cannot join a
cooperative organization," he said, implying that it was
neither troubling nor surprising that three communists may
have found their way into the Farmer's Union and that their
presence was no proof of communist influence in the
.
t"ion. 30
organ1za

A second attack on a group dear to Langer was more a
product of the Senator's imagination, or perhaps of his
unwillingness to leave the Senate floor without delivering
the tirade he had prepared for the day.

After Louis Budenz
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said in a Congressional hearing on the American communist
movement that it had been Owen Lattimore's assignment to
represent the Chinese communists as "nothing but North
Dakota Non-Partisan Leaguers," Langer exploded on the Senate
floor as if the NPL had been labelled a communist front.

He

was appalled that " . . . a man who, so far as I know, never
has been to North Dakota, should take the name of the NonPartisan League in vain, and even by innuendo or insinuation
try to mix it up with Russian Communists. 1131

When Senator

Owen Brewster of Maine pointed out that the statement was
actually a compliment to the NPL, Langer would have none of
it and proceeded to insert articles and chapters from books
that filled twenty-three pages in the Record.

32

Langer not only defended groups closely identified with
North Dakota; when the National Lawyer's Guild was accused
by Attorney General Brownall of subversion, Langer defended
it on the Senate floor in a speech entitled "National
Lawyer's Guild--Legal Bulwark of Democracy."

"In my

opinion," Langer said, "the Lawyer's [sic] of the National
Lawyer's Guild are just as loyal as any Senator on this
floor. 1133

Many criticized Langer for his defense of the

Guild, but he responded by placing the responsibility for a
final judgement on the office of the attorney general:
"Certainly if there was any proof that the National Lawyer's
Guild was communistic, I have every confidence that the
Attorney General would have so designated them a long time

63

ago. 1134

After the attorney general castigated the Guild in

stronger terms (although he never formally declared the
Guild subversive), Langer was less friendly, calling the
organization a "stench in the nostrils of every decent
attorney," and a group that "without any question in the
world, is communistic and properly designated as one of
.

.

.

su b versive activity.
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Langer's concern for civil liberties led him to
associate himself with the Emergency Civil Liberties
Committee directed by Clark Foreman and headquartered in New
York City.

Langer's staff worked closely with Foreman's.

In August 1955, Langer agreed to allow Foreman to mail 5,000
copies of a brief from his office, apparently under Langer's
frank.

After Foreman offered only to send the labels to

Langer's office and pay for the labor of sticking them on
the publication, Langer responded that "the work must be
done under supervision in my office but you ~ill have to
provide the manpower to do it. 1136
In 1955, Langer was the featured speaker at a
conference sponsored by the ECLC in Philadelphia.

Although

Langer received top billing, other prominent civil libertarians present were Louis L. Redding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Nation writer
Frank Donner, and I. F. Stone, editor of I. F. Stone's
Weekly.
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Langer's appearance at the conference puzzled some of
his supporters and infuriated the editors of the Hearst
newspaper chain.

A veterans' group which had asked Langer

to speak withdrew its invitation, and the New York Journal
American fumed in an article entitled "Senator at Red-tinted
Hoe Down" that Langer offered the "piece de resistance" in a
"monotonous menu" of speeches, many of which were given by
people who had been indicted on charges of being a
cornmunist.
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Langer continued to puzzle observers when only

days after appearing at the ECLC conference he spoke ~o the
anti-communist Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe
and, according to the New York Herald Tribune, "won their
he.arts. 1139

When asked about the apparent contradiction,

Langer replied that "as a member of the United States
Senate, I feel free to address any group of American
ci. t.1zens. ..40
In late 1955, Langer spoke at an "assembly for justice"
in New York on behalf of Morton Sobell, an alleged communist
sympathizer imprisoned in Alcatraz on charges of espionage.
Hearst writer Leon Racht noted that according to the Daily
Worker, Langer had said that he would do "everything in his
power" to ~ee that "Mrs. Sobell's husband" received justice.
Racht blasted Langer's "ranting" in front of "1,800
communists and fellow travelers" and claimed that the
Senator's propensity to back the common people against the
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so-called "greedy, grasping" monopolies was further evidence
of Langer's weakness on the communist issue.

41

Civil liberties groups other than the ECLC lauded
Langer's work to preserve civil liberties.

A member of The

Committee to End Sedition Laws wrote Langer and noted his
"world reputation for fair play and insistence upon the
• ht so f our peop 1 e.
rig

II

42

• •
•
•
'
Firing
Line,
An Arn erican
Legion

publication, blasted Langer's affiliation with the ECLC and
other "communist-front" groups.
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After Langer addressed

the ECLC in a rally at Carnegie Hall in New York City, the
Federal Employees Veterans Association canceled a speech
Langer was scheduled to deliver to them a few days later.

A

surprised Langer issued a press release which argued that
veterans of any group should be concerned about their civil

.
44
l i'b erties.
Langer was a humanitarian.

He could not resist taking

up the case of an underdog, no matter where that underdog
might reside.

He often, for example, took on the cases of

residents of Washington D. C.

He also endeared himself to

his fellow Senators over the years by showing genuine
concern for their families.

Langer could not bear to ignore

suffering if it was within his sight.
There is also little doubt that Langer's concern for
civil liberties was authentic.

Some of Langer's longest and

most impassioned letters are to non-North Dakotans and
concern civil liberties.

He worked diligently on behalf of
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many he believed to be falsely accused of a crime even
though few of them had any ties to North Dakota.

He spent

much time and energy promoting civil libertarian causes
despite there being little probability that such efforts
would increase his support at home.
Yet his civil libertarian beliefs did not always hold
sway; often they were overshadowed by other, more pressing
concerns.

And both Langer's humanitarianism and his civil

libertarianism were handicapped by his inability to draft
passable legislation.
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IV
Langer, Germany, and the Internal Security Act of 1950

Langer's opposition to the Internal Security Act of
1950 could be viewed as an act of courage in defense of
civil liberties at a time when anti-communist hysteria was
running high.

Langer spoke against the Act at many times

during the debate, and to prolong matters, he filibustered
from midnight until he dropped of exhaustion at nearly five
o'clock in the morning.

He was taken by ambulance to

Bethesda Naval Hospital where he remained for seven days.
Langer's arguments against the Internal Security Act
centered upon the effects that the Act would have on free
speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of thought.

But

Langer's behavior after the Act's passage suggests that he
had another motive in mind; passage of the Internal Security
Act would make it more difficult for Germans and Austrians
to enter the United States.

Once the attorney general

interpreted the Act in a way which allowed more Germans to
jl

immigrate to the United States, Langer's opposition to the
Act all but vanished.
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Langer's opposition to an act which would limit the
ability of Germans to immigrate was consistent with his
career-long dedication to German causes.

He had long

deplored American policy in post-war Europe.

In 1946 he had

issued what was to be only the first of many long diatribes
on the subject.

His rhetoric at that time was even more

inflated than usual:
. . . when the whited sepulchers of our empty
promises which are now being filled with the
wasted flesh and bones of innocent and guilty
alike are fully exposed to view, when our riches
win us nothing but universal loathing, when we are
unable longer to take the names of Jefferson,
Washington, or Lincoln upon our lips without
shame, when we must cast our eyes to dust at the
mention of the name of our Lord and Master, then
the American people will dema£d to know who has
smeared them with this guilt.
In

1947 Langer argued that the Morgenthau Plan to

pastoralize Germany was designed "to make the annihilation
and the extermination of the German nation and of the German
people complete. 112

Also in 1947, Langer began to argue that

American policy in Germany was the product of "deliberate
betrayal" by communists within the Truman administration.

3

In 1948 Langer railed against the "unholy" record of
the United States Government in Germany.

Charging that as

many as 4,000,000 Germans had died from mistreatment or
starvation during forced relocation programs, he maintained
that an administration "blinded by wartime passions" was
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following a war against Nazi inhumanity with equal
inhumanities of its own.

4

Langer was offended at the nature of the justice meted
out by the United States military courts in occupied
Germany.

"We cannot have a double standard of justice, one

brand for us at home and another for export," he said in

1949.

"We must get to the bottom of this shocking deviation

from American principles .

115

As evidence of wrongdoing,

Langer cited numerous beatings, forced confessions and
hangings of Germans he believed were denied due process by
.
. 1 s. 6
American
o ff.icia
Langer believed that even after the Soviets were no
longer involved in the Nuremburg trials they continued to
contol them from behind the scenes.

Langer demanded that

the payrolls of the American prosecution staff at the trials
be subpeonaed by the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Then, he

claimed, " . . . it will be seen that the entire prosecution
staff was composed of leftists and men who since have been
exposed as communists and members of communist front
organizations. 117

Langer also revealed in 1949 that his

German-American constituents in North Dakota unanimously
agreed that unless America sent food to Germany, the
communists would take over that country.

8

Had not Langer's eccentricity and ineptitude already
discredited him with the media and his fellow Senators, his
use of the communist issue might have succeeded in bring-ing
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attention to the German problem.

His arguments echo those

of the China Lobby, which assumed that policies that in
retrospect worked to bring about the downfall of the
Nationalist government in that country must by implication
have been inspired and implemented by communist spies.
Soon, however, the threat to the German cause was to come
not from the State Department,· but from the Senate itself.
When the Mundt-Nixon bill to control subversives was
introduced in 1950, Langer objected to it on civil
libertarian grounds, noting that it was opposed by many
labor unions, the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and the National Lawyers Guild.

Langer cited Charles Evans

Hughes' opposition to anti-subversion measures and asked his
fellow Senators if they thought Hughes had been a

. t .9
communis
After Mundt-Nixon was incorporated into what was to
become the Internal Security Act of 1950, it· became apparent
to Langer that the Act's immigration restrictions and
deportation provisions would greatly affect Germans
attempting to immigrate to the United States as well as
Germans who had already arrived.

The Act, he later argued,

would prevent 90 percent of those Germans who wished to come
to the United States from doing so.

10

Langer knew that it would be futile to argue for
leniency for German immigrants while memories of World War
II were still fresh.

Instead, Langer decided that the most

!

I

1...:........
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compelling arguments against the Act concerned its effects
upon traditional American civil liberties.

Langer

consistently worked to advance the cause of Germans, but his
methods had come full circle from his earlier use of anticommunism to discredit American policy in Germany, to his
later contention that the Internal Security Act would harm
traditional civil liberties.

It simply would not work to

charge that the Internal Security Act of 1950 was a
communist plot, although Langer would later attempt to make
such a connection.
Despite Langer's use of anti-communist arguments to
oppose American policy in Germany, Senator Pat McCarran of
Nevada, the author of the Internal Security Act of 1950,
attacked Langer for his opposition to the act by questioning
his patriotism.

The position Langer took, McCarran said,

"is supported by every communist organization in the
world. 1111
Langer's opposition to the Internal Security Act led
him to filibuster several times before his final, dramatic
collapse on the floor of the Senate during the last day of
debate.

The bill passed while Langer was in the hospital,

and Langer determined to work for its repeal.
Less than two months out of the hospital, Langer
traveled to Germany to assess the effects of the Internal
Security Act on the German people.

Upon his return, he gave

a report to the Senate in which he alleged that the Act was
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playing into the hands of the communists in Germany.

"Just

as with denazification," Langer said, "so this interpretation of the security law tends to divide the Germans
from the Americans," thus accomplishing the purpose of the
communists and "fellow-travelers" in Washington.

12

In

particular, Langer was offended that the act would bar from
the United States former members of the Nazi youth who had
joined the organization when they were as young as 10 years
old.

13
Langer's efforts were not in vain.

In late December of

1950, he received word from Senator McCarran that the
hardship on Germans was caused by a "misinterpretation" of
the law.

14

A few days later, the act was "reinterpreted" by

the attorney general, and Langer was able to write a
concerned citizen in Pennsylvania that the Senate "just
didn't seem to have the nerve to repeal it [the Internal
Security Act] as they should have, but this goes a long
way."15
Only a few more days later, Langer began to waffle on
the issue to constituents who wrote supporting his previous
stand against the Act.

To one who wrote asking Langer to

author a bill to repeal the Act, Langer replied that it
would do no good to introduce such a bill because McCarran
was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and therefore there
would be no chance to get such a bill out of cornrnittee.

16

Such an excuse is particularly flimsy corning from Langer,
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who throughout his career introduced hundreds upon hundreds
of bills he knew would die in committee.

Furthermore, when

Langer replaced McCarran as chairman of the Judiciary
Committee in 1953, he did nothing to repeal the bill.

In

fact, the reinterpretation by the attorney general seemed to
satisfy all of Langer's objections to the Internal Security
Act.
Langer continued to charge that the communists were
behind American policy in Germany.

In early 1951 he

proposed that a senate investigating committee look into the
role of "the Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White crowd" in the
siezure of German property following the war.

At the same

time, he nominated Senators McCarthy and Nixon, "who have
worked admirably to ferret out communists" from the American
government, to sit on the committee.

17

Langer's opposition to the Internal Security Act as
reinterpreted by the attorney general was limited to an
occasional brief statement.

Indeed, in 1954, Langer

introduced an amendment to strengthen the Act by requiring
that communist-front organizations not only had to register
as such with the government, but had to register all of
their printing equipment and printed materials as well.

The

amendment was to make illegal many "communist underground"
printing facilities that Langer contended made up an
"integral part of the conspiratorial operation of the
Communists in this country . . .

1118
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As late as 1955, Langer wrote to constituents concerned
about the discriminatory provisions in the Internal Security
Act that he would "see what he could do" to get it
repealed. 19

Langer's views became more evident in 1957 when

a group of citizens wrote Langer in opposition to a change
of the immigration laws that they feared would "permit the
admission of Asiatics in wholesale numbers.

1120

Langer

replied that he agreed, and would "keep on fighting against
any measure which would weaken our present immigration
.laws. 1121
Although the immigration reform bill McCarran later cosponsored with Congressman Francis Walter of Pennsylvania
(the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952) contained much that Langer
could have found objectionable on civil-libertarian grounds,
it also contained a provision that required positive proof
that aliens who were "believers in Nazism and Fascism" had
tried to advocate the establishment of those ideologies in
the United States before such persons could be deported.
That provision, as it happens, was objectionable to one
German-American, President Dwight Eisenhower, but it may
have served to smooth the passage of the bill through the
Senate by silencing the opposition of the senior senator
from North Dakota.

22
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V

Langer's Response to the McCarthy Era

William Langer, like most Americans of his day, accepted
the major premises of anti-communism.

Although his sympathy

for individual cases often led him to defend persons accused
of having communist sympathies, and although his civil libertarian beliefs led him to question the methods used by the
more zealous opponents of communism, Langer was a true
believer in the perils of international communism.
The foundations of Langer's anti-communism were laid
during his early days as a progressive politician in North
Dakota.

Langer had left the Nonpartisan League in 1920

because he thought the organization had come under the
control of a few "elite" eastern intellectuals.

In the same

way, he saw communism in the Soviet Union and in Eastern
Europe as an evil, not so much because it was atheistic and
favored the redistribution of wealth, but because it
represented to Langer a dictatorship of an intellectual
elite at the expense of the common man, especially the
farmer.

Langer considered communists to be in the same
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category as the interests and the monopolies.

Both groups

represented control over the many by the few.
Langer's anti-communist ideas concentrated on improving
the lot of the underprivileged:

"We wiped out the communist

party in North Dakota while I was governor," he believed,
"not by force, not by taking their names off the ballot, but
by having a government there of the people, for the people
and by the people--a government where every man is king and
every woman queen. 111

During the peak of the Cold War,

Langer held that "The best way to wipe out communism is to
see to it that every poor man owns his own home and his own
property."

2

Although the official policy of the United States
government interpreted anti-communism to be nearly
synonomous with opposition to the Soviet Union, Langer's
anti-communism was consistently shaped by his "common man"
philosophy.

The difference between Langer's view and the

official view became apparent in 1950 when the Senate voted
to give aid to Yugoslavia in reward for Tito's resistance to
Soviet hegemony.

Langer balked.

The United States govern-

ment, Langer charged, was "giving millions of dollars to a
bloody Communist outfit which murdered hundreds of thousands
of families, took hundreds of thousands of homes," and which
was now looking to the United States to supply food the
Yugoslav farmers had rightly refused to produce.

3

To Langer

the communists in Yugoslavia represented to farmers there
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the same evils the interests and monopolies represented to
the farmers of North Dakota.

"The common man," Langer said

on the Senate floor, "doesn't want the communists in control
any more than he wants the Rockefellers in control. 114
Langer often emphasized the low regard communists held
for the notion of private property and came to regard any
threat to private property as a communist plot.

Using the

argument that confiscation of property is one of the first
steps of a communist regime, Langer attempted to label the
Allied confiscation of German property following World War
II an implemenation of communist ideology.

5

In 1951, Langer

wrote in a letter to John J. Mccloy, United States High
Commissioner for Germany, " . . . I have criticized
unmercifully the denaz1fication program.

I am entirely

satisfied that if it was not instigated, it was assisted by
the Communists. 116
Langer's anti-communism, although built on the
principles he inherited from the progressive movement, was
never an end in itself; most often it was employed as a
weapon in his fight against what he saw to be greater evils.
Anti-communist activism is not a consistent theme in
Langer's career.

His two dalliances with th~ movement,

during the Red Scare of the 1920's and from 1946 through the
end of the McCarthy era, occurred only when anti-communism
was the political weapon of choice.

Langer actively sought

out communists during his tenure as attorney general of
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North Dakota, but soon gave up on the notion that it was
possible to root out communists from society.

From that

time on, Langer employed anti-communism primarily as a tool
to achieve other political ends, most prominently to protest
the American occupation policies in Germany.
Langer's ardent opposition to the Allied policy in
occupied Germany stemmed from his desire to please his
German constituency.

Many of these North Dakotans received

word from their relatives in Germany describing the
conditions there, and many more attempted to help their
relatives emigrate to the United States.

Langer's goal was

to moderate Allied policy in whatever way and by whatever
means he could.

He often chose as his tool the explosive

issue of "communism in government."
Langer had no sympathy for the State Department, which,
he noted often, did not employ a single North Dakotan.

He

castigated its officials as persons "who have never milked a
cow, who never worked a single day with their hands as day
laborers, who never knew what it was like to try to support
a family on $100 a month, and who have no more conception of
the sweat and the labor that it takes to produce a dollar
than the man on the moon."

These men were the equivalent of

the House of Morgan, Dillon, Read & Co., and the
Rockefellers, "the millionaire autocracy. 117
Langer's charges of communist infiltration in the State
Department are more eloquent and would seem at first glance
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to be even more disturbing to the sensitivities of a Cold
War American than would the statements made by Senator
McCarthy.

But Langer's charges did not resonate with the

press and with tne American people as did the charges made
by McCarthy.

Langer's eccentricity had already discredited

him with the press, and.his charges were often hidden in a
burst of feverish pronouncements, many of which were contradictory.

McCarthy was an effective propagandist while the

media saw Langer as little more than a cranky relic of the
past given over to occasional bursts of irrationality on the
Senate floor.
111

Many of Langer's speeches and letters to constituents

,dII'
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were based on the assumption that the State Department was
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riddled with communists.

"These Russian Communists [in the

,111

'll!:I

111

State Department] have just about succeeded in wrecking
America," Langer wrote to J. M. Wylie of Fargo in 1950.

"I

don't know what else we can do to clean up the Communist
situation as apparently there is no way of getting rid of
Mr. Acheson unless the House brings impeachment proceedings.118

American policy in Allied-occupied Germany provided

Langer with ample opportunity to charge that the Department
was infiltrated by persons taking directions from the
Kremlin.
Anti-communism dovetailed neatly with some of Langer's
pet causes.

He was easily able to use anti-communism to

express his hatred for the United Nations, for example.
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Langer, who was one of two senators to vote against the UN
charter, often attempted to stain the organization with the
alleged disloyalty of members of Truman's staff.

In a

speech against the UN in 1951, Langer charged that the
blueprint for the international organization was drawn up by
treasonous Alger Hiss. 9
Langer's isolationism served at times to moderate his
anti-communism.

Although many politicians used the issue of

international communism to justify an expanded American role
overseas, Langer denied that the best way to fight communism
was through force and increased military spending.

Langer

did not believe that the communist threat justified an
increase in covert activities by American intelligence
agencies.

Such activities violated the principles upon

which the United States was founded and they would threaten
the civil liberties of Americans should the CIA turn its
attention to within American borders.
When the United States government, acting through the
CIA, helped overthrow the government of Guatemala in 1954
Langer was particularly critical, citing the lack of
information given to Congress as his reason.

"Is there a

foreign invasion in Guatemala or is there a civil war?" he
asked on the Senate floor.

''If it is a foreign invasion,

exactly who are the invading forces and who are behind
them? 1110

Langer doubted whether the issue in Guatemala

really was the spread of a communist conspiracy and he
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raised the question of whether the Central American
country's problems might be due more to social injustices
and the "baleful influence" of the United Fruit Company than
to the "malignant machinations of international
.

communism.

..11

Langer always regarded the CIA with suspicion, but he
always treated the Federal Bureau of Investigation with
respect.

Langer trusted J. Edgar Hoover to have complete

control over the issue of domestic communists.

Never did

Langer see fit to criticize the Bureau for possible
violation of civil liberties.

Only the CIA posed a threat

of becoming "an American gestapo.

1112

Hoover's agency was often useful to Langer, sometimes
in unexpected ways.

For example, Hoover's penchant for

issuing exact numbers of communists in each state was
helpful to Langer when he sought to refute charges that the
North Dakota Nonpartisan League and Farmer's Union were
communist.

Langer used Hoover's numbers to show that North

Dakota's handful of communists could not possibly threaten
the national interest.
Hoover often responded personally to Langer's many
letters to the Bureau.

In one case, in a typical Langer

ploy, he forwarded to Hoover "for investigation"
a post card from a Mr. Dilley in Detroit on which he
scribbled "any Senator who would use his franking privilege
to defend such a subversive bunch of traitors [as the
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National Lawyers Guild] has enlisted in the red army under
Stalin."13

Hoover informed Langer that he had dispatched

two agents to interview Dilley and that the results of the
interview would be forwarded to the attorney general's
office.

A subsequent letter from an assistant to the

attorney general revealed that the frightened Mr. Dilley had
produced absolutely no proof of Langer's communist
affiliations when the agents confronted him.

14

Langer used anti-communism only when it suited his
ends.

When President Eisenhower neglected to consult Langer

before making several appointments to federal offices in
North Dakota, Langer employed anti-communism to show his
anger at the administration.

As a direct result of Eisen-

hower's snub, Langer obstructed the confirmation of Earl
Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and insisted
that the FBI determine whether Warren was a stooge of the
Kremlin, as several letters to the North Dakota senator had
charged.

Later Langer "sent Washington puzzling," in the

words of the U. S. News, with'a sporadic inquiry into
charges that Federal Judge Luther Youngdahl was biased in
favor of Owen Lattimore, who was about to be tried in
Youngdahl's court on perjury charges.

15

Such allegations by

Langer were, because Lattimore's case centered on charges of
communism, tantamount to accusing Youngdahl of communist
sympathies.
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Langer never maintained that either Warren or Youngdahl
were corrununists, but the credence he gave to spurious
charges made in letters of questionable origin served to
embarrass everyone involved.

Perhaps the media suspected

that Langer was making a mockery of the witchhunts; in any
case, his charges never were taken seriously, even by the
most virulently_ anti-corrununist groups.

Langer did not make

anti-corrununism an issue in his political campaigns, although
Richard Nixon urged him to do so in 1951. 16
Langer echoed McCarthy's charge that the Democrats in
the executive branch had presided over "eighteen years of
treason" in a speech prepared for delivery on the Senate
floor in August 1950.

At that time, Langer charged that

" . . . After 18 years of Democratic rule . . . 18 years of
appeasing corrununists--of alignments with foreign nations who
today are in possession of all our secrets . . . we stand at
the lowest ebb in decades, sacrificing our youth in
battle. 1117

But Langer's fury at the established political

parties was not limited to the Democrats.

He later inserted

letters into the Record accusing Mr. Republican himself,
Senator Robert Taft, of communist sympathies.
Langer and Joseph McCarthy shared many characteristics.
Both were from the midwest and were often in accord on farm
issues.

Both entered the Senate followed by charges of

previous corruption in the politics of their home state.
Both were outsiders in the Senate club.
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Although skilled practitioners of the arm-around-theshoulder, glad-handing political style, both Langer and
McCarthy seemed to suffer from feelings of inadequacy and
inferiority which resulted in their propensity to exaggerate
their achievements.

Perhaps as a response to their initial

rejection by Senate insiders, both were more than happy to
manipulate the rules and trample upon the venerable
traditions of the Senate.

Both developed a personal

following in their home states and across the nation
independent of traditional party lines.
Historian Richard Fried has described the principal
elements of McCarthy's style as "recklessness in accusation,
careless innaccuracy of statement, and abuse of those who
criticized him."

Such a description also describes Langer's

methods at their worst. 18
Although both were Republicans, Langer and McCarthy
often opposed Eisenhower.

The president feared McCarthy

more; Eisenhower's disdain for the junior Senator from
Wisconsin never interfered with McCarthy's control of
federal patronage.

Langer, however, was sometimes denied

the privilege of advice on federal appointments, much to his

.
19
d 1smay.
Not surprisingly, Langer's policy of supporting German
causes led him to support McCarthy's advocacy of the cause
of German SS troops who were scheduled to die for their part
in the Malemedy massacre during World War II.

There is no
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indication, however, that the two Senators coordinated their
efforts on behalf of the doomed Germans.
When McCarthy attacked the alleged communists in the
State Department on the Senate floor in February 1950,
Langer rose briefly to support the Wisconsin senator.

20

When other senators protested McCarthy's refusal to list the
names of those accused of being communists, Langer noted
that the Judiciary Committee had been investigating
corrununists for more than half the year, and that he thought
the senator from Wisconsin was entirely correct.

21

Langer

left the floor as McCarthy continued his diatribe, however,
and subsequently made a habit of absenting himself from the
Senate when McCarthy was making his charges.

Such behavior

was unusual for Langer who usually remained in his front
seat and listened intently to even the most esoteric and
lengthy speeches.
Langer defended McCarthy in 1951 when the Wisconsin
senator came under attack from Senators Humphery, Harley
Kilgore of West Virginia, and Herbert Lehmann of New York
for his investigative tactics.

McCarthy was not in

Washington at the time, and Langer was "disgusted" that the
Wisconsin senator did not have the opportunity to defend
himself.

Langer backed McCarthy's claims that communist

spies had penetrated crucial areas of the United States
government.

In particular, Langer thought it unpardonable

that the Roosevelt administration had given $2 billion to a
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project (Los Alamos) that employed a spy who "day after day,
as our government was developing the atom bomb, was giving
the secrets to Russia."

Given such activities, Langer

questioned, what is a United States Senator to do but to
investigate as McCarthy had done?

22

Langer's defenses of McCarthy occurred early in
McCarthy's era of prominence and could be seen as an attempt
by Langer to discredit the State Department and the
Roosevelt administration as much as they were an attempt to
defend McCarthy.

In any case, Langer did not defend

McCarthy again on the Senate floor until the proceedings to
censure the Wisconsin senator began in 1954.

At that time

Langer rose only to mention that Senator Bob LaFollette of
Wisconsin had denied the authority of one group of Senators
to compel another senator to appear before it, just as
McCarthy had done when he ignored a subpeona to appear
before a Senate cornrnittee.

23

Although Langer approved of McCarthy's selection of
targets, he could never reconcile himself to McCarthy's
methods of guilt-by-association.

Langer's ambivalence

towards McCarthy is illustrated by his absence during most
of McCarthy's diatribes.

If Langer happened to be on the

floor when McCarthy began, he stayed only long enough to ask
a few harmless questions about communist infiltration in the
State Department before leaving.

24
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Langer was a firm believer in the virtues of temperance
and a honorary member of the Women's Christian Temperance
Union, and McCarthy's drinking habits may have offended him.
When McCarthy begged to be excused from the Senate hearings
on his censure because of an "arm injury," Langer may have
shared the suspicions of those who believed McCarthy was
merely "drying out."

On Senate floor, Langer claimed to be

"moved to tears" by McCarthy's problems and suggested that
the Senate send him roses.

True to form, Langer sent

.McCarthy a bouquet of roses and received a thank you note
from the hospitalized senator a few days later.

25

Langer and McCarthy tangled briefly in 1953 after
Langer became chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

As

chairman, Langer sought to maintain his committee's leading
role in the investigation of communism in the face of a
challenge by McCarthy, who was attempting to make the
investigating subcommittee of the Government Operations
Committee his platform for inquiries into the issue.

Both

McCarthy and Langer hoped to appoint Senator Horner Ferguson
of Michigan to head their respective subcommittees.

26

The dispute was settled by an agreement between Senator
Jenner, who was to become the chairman of the Internal
Security Committee under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary
Committee, and McCarthy.

Although McCarthy's committee "was

not yielding any of its prerogatives," it would "leave the
subversive field largely to Mr. Jenner. 1127

It appeared ·as
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though the agreement would have the effect of divorcing
McCarthy from the investigation of communism, but such was
not the case.

More significant than the agreement between

Jenner and McCarthy was the Senate's decision to fund
liberally each of the rival committees,

28

leaving the door

open for McCarthy to continue his roughshod investigations
by disregarding the spirit, if. not the letter, of his
agreement with Jenner.
In the battle over the authority to investigate
communism in government, Langer had weighed in against
McCarthy, as might be expected from the chairman of a
committee whose jurisdiction was threatened.

Because

McCarthy disregarded the agreement between he and Jenner,
the dispute ended in a short-term defeat for the Judiciary
Committee.
Langer refused to commit himself before the Senate vote
to censure McCarthy in 1954.

In the end he voted against

the cen~ure, but he maintained all along that he was
attempting to be impartial, just as if he were ''acting as
judge and jury."

Langer was troubled because he was

convinced that the legal grounds on which the censure was
based had little to do with the motives of many of the
Senators voting for the censure.

Rather than being

subjected to a censure, Langer believed that a Senator
should be either expelled by vote of the Senate or allowed
to remain. 29

In a letter that explained his vote against

94

the censure to a resident of Brooklyn, Langer expressed his
concern that if use of the censure motion become a norm, he
would himself eventually be censured for his espousal of
. .
30
unpopu 1 ar opinions.

Many of the issues raised in 1954 during the debate
over the censure of McCarthy recalled those of Langer's
seating debate in 1941, and Langer was fully aware that he
was eventually seated due to confusion in the Senate over
that body's authority to pass judgement on him.

In 1941,

the Senate decided to leave the matter in the hands of North
Dakota voters.

However, according to columnist David

Lawrence, if the Senate had the right to judge McCarthy it
might also have the authority to reopen Langer's case and
judge him as well.

31

Despite their many similarities, the anti-communism of
McCarthy and the anti-communism of Langer differed.
Although both were reckless in charging that government
officials were communist, Langer sought less to gain
publicity than to change United States policy in Germany.
Langer's eccentricity discredited him with the media to the
extent that his charges were usually not reported.

Langer's

charges were always broad and never made sensational claims
that could be based upon documents.

He only attacked

persons already identified by others as possible communists,
and his attacks were often so overblown that it was
difficult to take them seriously.
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Historian Micheal Rogin has placed Langer firmly in the
McCarthyite camp, but it is probably not accurate to
classify Langer as either a McCarthyite or an antiMcCarthyite.32

Neither Langer's McCarthyism nor his defense

of civil liberties were central to his political program.
Both were used as tools to further what Langer thought was
more important--the obstruction of a farm bill that he
believed to be harmful to North Dakota farmers, for example,
or his effort to cause a change in the policy that guided
the Allies in occupied Germany.
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VI
Conclusion

To William Langer, senatorial politics had nothing to
do with the art of the possible and everything to do with
the art of getting reelected to represent a state with a
small population.

Such an art required the passage of no

legislation, only fastidious attention to the needs of
individual constituents and the creation of an illusion of
influence and importance.

Langer created this illusion

through personal contact, through the use of the
Congressional Record, and by pulling publicity stunts which
resulted in the occasional appearance of an article about
him on the front page of the New York Times.

Tales of

Langer's work habits are no doubt true; sadly, only the
effort he put into the cases of individual constituents did
much good.
There is something tragically compelling about this man
who undeniably possessed humanitarian instincts; who was
utterly devoted to his constituents and to his wife Lydia;
and who was willing, even eager, to work long hours at the
expense of his health for what he believed to be right.

98

As
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compelling as Langer's story is, however, those who search
for something larger underlying the anecdotes heard to this
day on the street corners and in the cafes of North Dakota
are grasping at air:

it is those stories alone that are the

lasting legacy of Langer's senatorial career.
Langer was perhaps· not so much incapable of entering
serious debate as a senator as he was fully aware of and
jealously protective of his luxurious irrelevance.

Langer's

impish behavior on the Senate floor, exemplified by the time
when he pulled cigars one-by-one from the pocket of a
Senator who was attempting to speak, adds credence to the
characterization of Langer as a humorist crank.

As such, he

would be at home in a body such as the House of Commons,
which, more than the United States Senate, maintains a
healthy sense of humor towards the occasional oddball whom
it seats.

Langer's habit of sabotaging any attempt by his

fellow senators to pass his own bills brings to mind the
practice of the Canadian Hippopotamus party of running a
second candidate against the first if it appears that the
first is going to win.
It is more appealing to a historian to view Langer as a
relic from the Progressive Era or perhaps as Wayne Morse
did, as the last of the prairie populists.

His rambling,

overblown rhetoric smacks of nineteenth-century oratory, and
he often viewed contemporary times through the eyeglasses of
a Theodore Roosevelt Republican.

Langer's interminable
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recitations on the Senate floor of his days as state's
attorney in Morton County, attorney general of North Dakota,
and governor seem to be nostalgic trips back to a time and a
place which made sense to him.
Langer defies most any categorization.

Furthermore, to

take Langer's pronouncements on the Senate floor at face
value and to assert that "Langer was staunchly opposed to
limits on filibuster," or "Langer was a fighter for civil
rights," is to mislead.

Langer's motives in Senate debate

were muddled and complex, and his ideology, if he had one,
was so eccentric to the 1940's and 1950's that it is
impossible to view him in conventional terms.

Langer's

inablility to translate his ideas into law calls into
question his seriousness as a Senator.

It may be best to

give him neither credit nor blame for the positions he took
on the issues of the day.
For Langer to know that he had tantalized serious
people, especially academics, with his occasional brilliance; had tortured them with his contradictions; had
amazed them with his complexity; and most of all, had fooled
them into taking him seriously--would have caused him to
smile with satisfaction.
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